Two Hosting Providers Canceled a Customer’s Site Over a Trademark Complaint

Kenneth Gaughan, a Maryland resident, has operated ESApet.org since 2019. In late 2025, InMotion Hosting and DreamHost both canceled his hosting accounts. The reason given in each case was a trademark complaint submitted by Elevate Rank LLC, the operator of ESApet.com. Gaughan’s site went down. On May 5, 2026, he filed suit against both hosting providers. The case raises a question that goes beyond this specific dispute: when a hosting provider cancels service in response to a trademark complaint, what legal framework is it actually operating under?

What the Lawsuit Claims

According to Gaughan’s filing, Elevate Rank LLC submitted trademark complaints to both InMotion Hosting and DreamHost, and both providers responded by terminating his hosting service. Elevate Rank holds a figurative mark for “ESApet” with a disclaimer noting that “ESApet” itself is descriptive. The trademark filing cites a first use date of 2017.

Gaughan’s allegations complicate that picture. He states that he has operated ESApet.org since 2019. He also alleges that Elevate Rank LLC was not formed until 2021, a date that, if accurate, is difficult to reconcile with a claimed first use of the mark in 2017. The history of ESApet.com adds another layer: the domain reportedly existed with different branding at some earlier point, then expired and was listed for sale, before Elevate Rank acquired and developed it. Gaughan started ESApet.org during the period the .com was dormant.

Domain Name Wire, which first reported on the lawsuit, notes a specific contradiction in InMotion Hosting’s handling of the situation. According to Gaughan, InMotion told him it would not take action without a court order or a trademark cancellation notice. InMotion then took down his site based on a complaint alone, with no court order and no cancellation of the mark.

The Legal Problem: DMCA Does Not Cover Trademark

The legal framework most hosting providers use for responding to third-party complaints about customer content is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Section 512 of the DMCA establishes a safe harbor for service providers: if a provider receives a compliant takedown notice alleging copyright infringement, responds by removing or disabling access to the infringing material, and follows the statute’s notice-and-counternotice process, the provider is shielded from copyright infringement liability. The process is defined, predictable, and gives the accused party a formal mechanism to dispute the claim.

None of that applies to trademark. The DMCA’s safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512 covers copyright claims only. There is no equivalent federal statutory safe harbor for hosting providers who receive trademark complaints. Trademark disputes have their own resolution mechanisms: the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) for cases involving alleged cybersquatting, and federal court under the Lanham Act for infringement claims. Those processes involve neutral arbitrators or courts, require evidence, and give both parties the opportunity to be heard.

When a hosting provider receives a trademark complaint and responds by canceling service without going through either of those processes, it is acting as a de facto enforcement mechanism for a claim that has not been adjudicated. The provider does not gain the statutory safe harbor the DMCA provides for copyright, because trademark is not copyright. It is also not insulated from liability if the trademark claim turns out to be unfounded, as Gaughan’s allegations suggest this one may be.

How Complaints Get Blurred in Practice

The confusion between copyright and trademark complaints is not accidental. A significant industry of “brand protection” services operates by submitting complaints to hosting providers, domain registrars, and platforms on behalf of trademark holders. These firms work at volume, and the complaints they submit often arrive formatted to resemble DMCA notices, referencing intellectual property violations in general terms without specifying whether the basis is copyright or trademark. Hosting providers and their abuse teams, processing high volumes of complaints, may not distinguish carefully between the two.

The practical effect is that trademark holders can achieve takedowns through the DMCA-adjacent complaint machinery without going through UDRP or filing a court action, both of which require presenting evidence and give the target party an opportunity to respond. A hosting provider that cancels service on the basis of a trademark complaint, without requiring a court order or UDRP decision, is providing a faster and cheaper enforcement pathway than the law actually contemplates for trademark disputes.

This is useful for legitimate trademark holders with clear cases. It is also useful for competitors who want to take down a rival’s site without the cost or procedural requirements of actual legal proceedings, and whose trademark claim may not survive scrutiny if it were subjected to that process. Gaughan’s case, where the complainant’s trademark cites a first use date that predates the alleged company formation by four years, is a version of that scenario that a UDRP panelist or a federal judge would be expected to examine closely. A hosting provider’s abuse team is not equipped or positioned to perform that analysis.

No Equivalent Safe Harbor: Why Trademark Complaints Cannot Follow DMCA Rules

The ESApet case is one data point, not a systemic survey of how hosting providers handle trademark complaints. But it illustrates a policy gap that has practical consequences for providers and their customers alike.

A hosting provider that cancels service in response to a trademark complaint, without requiring a court order or UDRP outcome, is making a judgment call about the validity of a legal claim it is not positioned to assess. If the claim is valid and the provider does nothing, it has potential exposure depending on jurisdiction and circumstances. If the claim is invalid and the provider takes down a legitimate customer’s site, it has canceled a customer’s service and potentially caused business harm on the basis of a competitor’s complaint. The Gaughan case is now in the federal litigation system, and InMotion and DreamHost will have to account for their decisions.

The DMCA’s notice-and-takedown system exists precisely because Congress decided that hosting providers needed a defined safe harbor with defined rules to operate under at scale. No equivalent framework was built for trademark because trademark disputes are more contextual, more fact-specific, and less amenable to the kind of automated, volume complaint processing the DMCA notice system enables. Providers that treat trademark complaints the same way they treat DMCA notices are importing a legal framework that does not apply and forgoing the procedural protections that framework was designed to provide.

The cleaner policy position is the one InMotion apparently stated and then failed to follow: require a court order or an official trademark cancellation or suspension decision before taking action on a trademark complaint. That standard is defensible precisely because it defers the substantive legal question to the institution that is actually authorized to resolve it.