One of bunny.net’s CDN nodes was hosted on a server in Pakistan that turned out to carry unauthorized SSH keys. They had been added through the virtualization layer of the infrastructure provider that supplied the server, and the company found no evidence that they were used. A different provider was involved in the earlier case, in October.
The provider reported unauthorized access involving third-party server management software on November 17, and bunny.net informed customers the next day on its status page and by email. The bunny.net node on that server had not been serving traffic for over a week because of maintenance related to regional network stability. The server was removed from the company’s systems within 8 minutes of the alert. The team then preserved the security logs, wiped the server and revoked its access to other systems. The company cannot rule out that data was accessed or copied through the virtualization layer.
According to the notice, the server held temporarily cached CDN content, Pull Zone configurations (the settings that connect a customer’s site to the CDN) and TLS certificates. No account data was stored on it, and no internal systems were affected.
Uploaded Certificates Need Customer Action
As a precaution, all TLS certificates for the platform domains b-cdn.net and bunny.run have been revoked and reissued. Managed certificates for customers’ own domains are being reissued as well, with completion expected within 24 hours of the November 18 notice. No action is needed from customers who use them. Those who upload their own certificates are advised to revoke them and issue new ones with new private keys.
When it closed the first incident, the company stated that it cannot do this on a customer’s behalf, and that until an uploaded certificate is replaced, the old certificate and its private key should be treated as compromised.
The First Incident, in Armenia
The earlier notice, on October 28, concerned a CDN node in Armenia. Its provider had reported unauthorized access, also involving third-party server management software, the week before. Traffic through that server stopped within 20 minutes of the alert, and neither bunny.net’s investigation nor the provider’s found evidence of unauthorized access to it.
Managed certificates were reissued by October 31. By November 4, every Let’s Encrypt certificate that had been on the server was revoked with the reason “key compromise”, and the incident was closed on November 9. The provider’s root-cause investigation was still under way at that point, and affected customers are to receive a summary by email once its final report arrives.
Less Reliance on Third-Party Cloud Platforms
After the first incident, bunny.net stopped using the affected provider. It also set out a change to how configurations are distributed, so that each point of presence, or network location, receives only the configuration and TLS certificates for the sites it actively serves. The second notice adds a review of the company’s reliance on third-party cloud platforms, which host a small portion of its CDN. The company has begun transitioning additional cloud-hosted locations and will continue evaluating the remaining environments.
A further update is due on the status page once the certificate reissuance is complete.